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ON THE "USEFULNESS" OF SUSPECT 
CLASSIFICATIONS 
James W. Ellis* 
If state action is the paradigm of a "conceptual disaster area" 
in constitutional analysis, the system of "tiers" of scrutiny in equal 
protection cases must be judged a close second. Justice Marshall's 
criticism of the Supreme Court's "rigidified approach"I has never 
been refuted, and the addition of an intermediate tier (or tiers) in 
the last decade has failed to dispel the confusion.2 Indeed, the fact 
that the Justices insist that identifiable tiers exist but cannot agree 
on their number must be a source of doctrinal discomfort. 
Nevertheless, some differentiation in the intensity of judicial 
scrutiny of challenged legislation seems necessary. The allied prin-
ciples of majoritarian democracy and judicial restraint require that 
courts give substantial deference to most actions of the political 
branches of government, while the guarantees of the fourteenth 
amendment demand more active judicial oversight of some egre-
gious types of discrimination. The only practical approaches are a 
sliding scale or a system of categories. Since the Court has nomi-
nally rejected the former, we must try to make sense of the tiers. 
Since the selection of the applicable tier for a particular case is 
usually outcome determinative, much attention has been given to 
the selection criteria. For nearly a half century following Carolene 
Products3 the appropriate factors were uncontroversial, and debate 
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2. Citations to the body of scholarly criticism of the tiered system would be unduly 
burdensome, even for a journal more liberal in such matters than this one. 
3. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, !52 n.4 (1938). See Lusky, 
Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1982). 
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centered on application of the factors to particular groups. But in 
the recent case of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 4 the 
Court cast doubt on the criteria themselves. The Justices an-
nounced, as an additional requirement, a rule of "presumptive ir-
relevance" of the classification to legitimate governmental 
objectives. 
The previous (if not "original") understanding held that legis-
lative enactments were subject to more exacting scrutiny if they dis-
criminated against a readily identifiable group that had suffered a 
history of invidious discrimination and was powerless, disen-
franchised, or substantially disadvantaged in the political arena.s 
Some of the cases also spoke of the immutability of the group's dis-
tinguishing trait, the "innocence" of individuals who had not volun-
tarily selected group membership, and harkening back to Carolene 
Products, the discreteness and insularity of the group in society.6 
Taken together, these factors roughly indicated the likelihood that 
legislators may be motivated by prejudice to treat group members 
unfairly. 
The issue in Cleburne was the appropriate level of review for 
laws that discriminate against people with mental retardation. Ap-
plying the traditional tests, the Fifth Circuit had held that height-
ened scrutiny was warranted. But because mental retardation was a 
useful classification for some legitimate legislative purposes, the 
court of appeals declined to declare it "suspect" and chose instead 
to employ the "middle" tier of scrutiny used in gender cases. Under 
this test, the constitutionality of a discriminatory statute depends on 
whether it is closely related to an important governmental purpose. 
The Supreme Court vacated this part of the Fifth Circuit's 
opinion and held that the proper measure for discrimination against 
retarded people was the rational basis test. 1 The Court made only a 
4. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). 
5. A typical description was provided by the Rodriquez majority in rejecting a claim of 
suspectness: 
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the tradi-
tional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or sub-
jected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from 
the majoritarian political processes. 
411 U.S. at 28. 
6. "In my opinion, the phrase 'discrete and insular' applies to groups that are not 
embraced within the bonds of community kinship but are held at arm's length by the group 
or groups that possess dominant political power." Lusky, supra note 3, at 1105 n.72. 
7. The Court went on to invalidate the zoning ordinance in question by holding that it 
did not even meet the minimal test of rationality. The distortion of the rational basis test that 
this holding requires, as well as other aspects of Cleburne, are beyond the scope of this article 
and shall be reserved for another occasion. 
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feeble attempt to argue that mental retardation does not meet the 
traditional indicia of suspectness. The principal message of the 
Court's opinion is that any form of heightened scrutiny is inappro-
priate for classifications that reasonable legislators could conscien-
tiously use for legitimate purposes. "Because mental retardation is 
a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into ac-
count in a wide range of decisions, ... we will not presume that any 
given legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded indi-
viduals, is rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not 
tolerate."s Irrelevance to any legitimate legislative purpose is a 
prominent feature of those classifications that are deemed suspect. 
Indeed, over the years, almost every Justice has rationalized strict 
scrutiny by noting that the classification at hand is seldom relevant 
to legitimate governmental purposes.9 However, these references 
have always been dicta, and the Court had never before suggested 
that the occasional usefulness of a particular classification was dis-
positive of the level of scrutiny.w The doctrinal news in Cleburne is 
that the classification must be presumptively irrelevant to valid legis-
lation before even intermediate scrutiny is justified. 
Observations about the frequency with which suspect traits are 
irrelevant are a far cry from a rule that presumption of irrelevance 
must be established as a prerequisite to careful judicial scrutiny of 
8. 105 S. Ct. at 3258. 
9. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion of 
Brennan, J.). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.l4 (1982) ("Classifications treated 
as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal."). Interestingly, one of the 
earliest references to this concept predates the full development of "tiered" analysis. "'Indi-
gence' in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying them. The mere state of 
being without funds is a neutral fact--constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or 
color." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
10. The Cleburne majority attempts to persuade that this is not true. Justice White 
contends: 
[T]he lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group affected by a law have 
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the state has the authority to im-
plement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal sys-
tem and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize 
legislative choices as to whether, how and to what extent those interests should be 
pursued. 
105 S. Ct. at 3255 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 
(1976)). 
But the Murgia opinion provides no support for this proposition. In that case, the Court 
concluded that aged persons did not constitute a suspect class because, historically, they had 
not been "subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly 
indicative of their abilities." 427 U.S. at 313. The actual lessons of Murgia were that the 
absence of a history of invidious discrimination precluded the finding of a suspect class, and 
that legislation based on the actual characteristics of a group should not be deemed invidious. 
The lesson of Cleburne, by contrast, is that past invidious discrimination against a group 
based on "stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their ability" is irrelevant to the 
issue of suspectness if some discriminatory laws are based on actual group characteristics. 
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discriminatory laws. The case of mental retardation is a good ex-
ample. Numerous laws treat people with mental retardation differ-
ently from people who are mentally typical. Over the years, 
legislatures have deemed mental disability to be relevant to such 
issues as guardianship, educational placement, public assistance, 
and civil commitment. Some of these laws, such as entitlement to 
disability benefits and the requirement of appropriate special educa-
tion opportunities, are based on realistic perceptions of the effects of 
mental retardation. Others, such as categorical exclusion from pub-
lic schools, institutional commitment without a requirement of dan-
gerousness to self or others, and Cleburne's exclusionary zoning 
ordinance, are based on false stereotypes. Cleburne teaches that the 
existence and legitimacy of the former groups of laws precludes 
heightened scrutiny of the latter, even where a substantial likeli-
hood is shown that some such laws are invidiously discriminatory. 
Justice Rehnquist has correctly observed that "every classifica-
tion is relevant to some purposes and irrelevant to others."tt Race 
has been found to be usable for remedying some kinds of past dis-
crimination and for implementing constitutional remedies to school 
segregation. Gender has been held relevant to conscription and the 
definition of statutory rape. Alienage is an acceptable ground for 
exclusion from some kinds of government jobs. If the fact that 
these classifications are relevant to some constitutionally valid pur-
poses were to preclude heightened scrutiny of all discriminatory 
laws affecting these classes, there would be nothing left of the prin-
ciple embodied in Footnote Four. 
The irrelevance of "presumptive irrelevance" can be seen by 
considering whether it should be sufficient, in the absence of the 
traditional indicia, to warrant heightened scrutiny. Left-handed 
people are a minority, and hypothetical laws that might use this 
trait as a classifying device would seldom, if ever, be related to ra-
tional governmental objectives. Thus "handedness" can be consid-
ered, even with greater certainty than race or gender, to be 
presumptively irrelevant to legitimate legislative goals. But left-
handedness presents a weak claim under the traditional test for sus-
pect classes. Although left-handedness is a largely immutable char-
acteristic, there has been no history of serious discrimination 
against this minority, nor are its members disadvantaged in the 
political arena. The political process would surely reject legislative 
proposals treating this group unfairly, and should discriminatory 
legislation somehow be enacted, a minimal level of judicial scrutiny 
would suffice to reject truly irrational discrimination. 
II. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. I, 42 n.13 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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The device selected for rationing heightened judicial scrutiny 
should roughly measure the likelihood that a particular instance of 
discrimination against the group in question is invidious. The tradi-
tional indicators of suspectness are useful because they show that 
discriminatory legislation may be invidious and that the political 
branches of government may be disinclined to protect the disfa-
vored group. The Cleburne requirement of presumptive irrelevance 
deprives the courts of the means they need to detect unconstitu-
tional discrimination against minorities that have been treated in-
vidiously in the past and are now viewed with residual animosity or 
ambivalence by the majority. 
Once again, mentally retarded people present a good illustra-
tion of the problem. Mental retardation is an immutable character-
istic that retarded people do not adopt voluntarily. Their history of 
invidious discrimination and oppressive legislation is matched by 
few other groups in our society.l2 A principal purpose of these laws 
was to maintain strict segregation of retarded people from the rest 
of society because they were viewed by legislators as a "social men-
ace" (e.g., Utah) and "unfit for citizenship" (Mississippi). Despite 
some recent ameliorative efforts, much of this legislation remains on 
the books. People with mental retardation are the quintessential 
disenfranchished minority: many states bar them from voting by 
statute or state constitution, and the nature of their disability pre-
vents substantial political participation even when legal barriers are 
removed. 
Justice White's efforts to demonstrate that mentally retarded 
people do not meet the traditional test for suspectness are unsuc-
cessful. The majority opinion does not even address the history of 
invidious discrimination, although this has been a principal focus in 
traditional analysis and is probative of the likelihood that discrimi-
natory laws are the result of prejudice. The opinion observes that 
there are different degrees of retardation, and thus it is not a com-
pletely homogeneous class. But the relevance of this observation is 
unclear, since invidious laws have almost invariably discriminated 
against retarded people without regard to the severity of their hand-
icap. The majority then declares that it can find no "continuing 
12. This history is briefly recounted in Justice Marshall's concurring and dissenting 
opinion. 105 S. Ct. at 3266-67. It is noteworthy that five members of the Court described 
this history as "grotesque." 105 S. Ct. at 3266 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun); 105 S. 
Ct. at 3262 (Stevens and Burger). For a somewhat fuller discussion of the nature of mental 
retardation and the history of laws affecting retarded people, see Ellis & Luckasson, Mentally 
Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 414,416-32 (1985). The amici cu-
riae briefs of the American Association on Mental Deficiency et al. and the Association for 
Retarded Citizens et al. contain much more detailed historical information, including statu-
tory and historiographical appendices. 
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antipathy or prejudice"B on the part of legislators, and observes 
that retarded people should not be viewed as politically powerless. 
Justice White's opinion supports these conclusions by noting the 
existence of recent federal and state enactments designed to assist 
mentally disabled people. But the existence of some beneficial laws 
does not preclude the existence of some (old or new) that are based 
on stereotyped prejudices. Indeed, the record of the Cleburne zon-
ing controversy stands as irrefutable evidence that such prejudices 
endure.t4 The Court's attempt to avoid heightened scrutiny by 
means of the traditional factors proves too much: applied to groups 
already granted special judicial protection it would require a return 
to minimal scrutiny. If the fact that advocates have obtained pas-
sage of some noninvidious, protective legislation precludes height-
ened scrutiny, women and racial minorities should now be 
consigned to the rational basis test. Similarly, if diversity within a 
group negates suspectness, few previously recognized minorities are 
entitled to suspect status. 
The majority opinion relies more heavily on the new doctrine 
of presumptive irrelevance than it does on the traditional considera-
tions for suspectness. This new doctrine is even more central to 
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion, which was joined by Chief 
Justice Burger. Justice Stevens, while joining the majority opinion, 
renewed his argument that there are not really any tiers at all, but 
rather different ways of explaining the application of a single stan-
dard of analysis. He once again argued that the rational basis test, 
"properly understood," is sufficient to explain even the racial dis-
crimination cases. He acknowledged that "[t]he Court must bees-
pecially vigilant in evaluating the rationality of any classification" 
that has been traditionally disfavored,ts and goes on to label as 
"grotesque" past discrimination against retarded people. But he 
also observed that mental retardation is relevant to some legitimate 
legislative goals, and therefore concluded that it cannot be said that 
all laws employing the classification are presumptively irrational. 
Somewhat more puzzling is the reliance Justice Stevens places 
on his supposition that some of the laws that disadvantage mentally 
retarded people on the basis of relevant criteria could be supported 
by a hypothetical legislator who was mentally retarded. If this is 
13. 105 S. Ct. at 3256. 
14. The Cleburne controversy was illustrative of the irrationality of the opposition to 
integration of mentally retarded people, but it lacked the violence that often accompanies 
such disputes. See amici curiae brief of American Association on Mental Deficiency et al. at 
16 n.25, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). See generally D. 
ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 180-99 (1984). 
15. 105 S. Ct. at 3261 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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meant merely to illustrate that some discriminatory laws, unlike the 
Cleburne ordinance, are demonstrably rational, it is unexception-
able but not particularly enlightening. If, on the other hand, it is 
intended to suggest that a classification cannot warrant heightened 
scrutiny when some members of a disadvantaged class could vote 
for some discriminatory legislation, larger problems loom. (Read-
ers are requested not to inform Mrs. Phyllis Schlafty that her exist-
ence and views are sufficient to overturn the decisions recognizing 
gender as a semi-suspect classification). 
These concurring Justices supplied the crucial votes for Justice 
White's majority opinion.I6 It is difficult to know exactly what to 
make of the concurrence. While denying the existence of a system 
of tiers, it acquiesces in the assignment of an admittedly vulnerable 
group to the lowest tier. Perhaps it is to be understood as simply a 
refusal to engage in the process of designating tiers (a position more 
consistent with the previous opinions of Justice Stevens than those 
of the Chief Justice). If so, it lends little support to Justice White's 
majority, because the two opinions would merely agree for different 
reasons on the rational basis test as the lowest common denomina-
tor. If, on the other hand, it is an exercise in tier-assigning under 
protest, it represents a stronger commitment to the new presump-
tive irrelevance doctrine than Justice White's, since the concurrence 
does not purport to use the traditional indicators at all. 
Perhaps the majority and concurring opinions can best be in-
terpreted as attempts to signal that the era of expansion of height-
ened scrutiny has ended. Many observers (and perhaps the 
Justices) thought this had been accomplished more than a decade 
ago in Rodriquez, but some Justices may still be uneasy about the 
prospect of other minority groups seeking judicial protection. Jus-
tice White's opinion suggests as much when it argues that affirming 
the Fifth Circuit's opinion would make it 
difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have 
perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves 
mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of preju-
dice from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only 
the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set out 
on that course, and we decline to do so.I7 
That the Court was worried primarily about extending protec-
tion to groups other than mentally retarded people is supported by 
16. The dissenting Justices reject the idea that presumptive irrelevance is a prerequisite 
to heightened scrutiny. 105 S. Ct. at 3270-71 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, JJ., con-
curring and dissenting). 
17. 105 S. Ct. at 3257-58. 
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the fact that the Court invalidated the statute in question. Indeed, 
the discussion of the appropriate tier of analysis, and surely the 
transformation of presumptive irrelevance into a prerequisite, were 
unnecessary dicta. Having determined that the Cleburne ordinance 
could not pass the rational basis test, the majority need not have 
ruled on whether any stricter test applied. The fact that the Justices 
reached out for the issue suggests that they wanted to send a 
message regarding heightened scrutiny: "this far but no further." 
It is inconceivable that the Court would apply the Cleburne 
doctrine of presumptive irrelevance to classifications previously rec-
ognized as suspect or semisuspect. Therefore its importance is for 
minorities upon which the Justices have not yet ruled. As the ma-
jority opinion noted, a number of these groups exist. 
The new rule declares that heightened scrutiny will only be ap-
plied to classifications that are rarely relevant to legitimate govern-
mental purposes. Therefore, the rational basis test will apply to 
groups that meet the traditional indicators of suspectness but are 
deemed relevant to some constitutionally acceptable legislative pur-
poses. This means either that invidious laws will escape careful 
scrutiny because of the deference traditionally associated with that 
test, or the test will be given new "bite" for these groups. The 
Court chose the latter course in Cleburne, and appeared to suggest 
that lower courts should do the same in future mental retardation 
cases. Is It gave no indication whether the same approach is to be 
followed regarding other groups denied explicit recognition of enti-
tlement to heightened scrutiny. If this approach is to be generally 
followed, it creates an unacknowledged fourth tier of analysis, the 
contours and requirements of which are unexplained. 
The Court's unsatisfactory analysis appears to derive from two 
sources. The first may be the Court's concern that the Footnote 
Four criteria cannot be given free rein without substantial incursion 
into legislative prerogatives. Justice Powell, for example, has 
warned that the criteria do not provide a "neat formula for consti-
tutional adjudication," nor do they require judicial intervention on 
behalf of "any group that loses a legislative battle."I9 The Justices' 
resistance to providing a judicial forum for reviewing the merits of 
18. The Court cited U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), and 
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982), to illustrate the proper use of the rational basis test. 
These are widely recognized as atypically rigorous examples of the test. 
19. Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087, 1090-92 (1982). 
Justice Rehnquist has gone further, arguing that the Carolene Products footnote should not 
be used to extend strict scrutiny beyond racial minorities, because "[i]t would hardly take 
extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find 'insular and discrete' minorities at every tum in 
the road." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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each political defeat of every minority in our society is understand-
able.2o The apparent conviction that this consequence can only be 
avoided by use of a narrowly restrictive presumption, however, 
seems an ill-considered overreaction. 
The other source of the Court's difficulty is its failure to ac-
knowledge the consequences of creating more than one level of 
heightened scrutiny. In the two-tiered world of equal protection 
before Craig v. Boren,21 the Court operated from a strong presump-
tion that the politically accountable branches of government acted 
within constitutional bounds; once that deference was abandoned 
upon the finding of a fundamental right or suspect classification, the 
Court erected an equally formidable presumption against constitu-
tionality. With the new creation of the middle tier(s), the presump-
tion of unconstitutionality is weaker for laws involving quasi-
suspect classes. The government must assert an important (not 
"compelling") interest; however, the relationship between statute 
and purpose that must be "close" need not be a perfect fit. But the 
Court has failed to elucidate what features characterize a quasi-sus-
pect class or to explain the relationship between such classes and 
the nature of intermediate scrutiny. Cleburne added nothing to our 
understanding of either issue. 
The Court has overlooked the opportunities intermediate scru-
tiny offers for less "rigidified" analysis than the two-tiered system. 
The middle tier can accommodate groups that match the traditional 
indicia of suspectness less perfectly than racial minorities 
(e.g., women) and those who possess those indicators but whose 
characteristics are not presumptively irrelevant to all legitimate 
20. Or perhaps part of the Court's concern may be the difficulty in some cases of deter-
mining whether an enactment really is a loss for the minority. As in the race and gender 
cases, the specters of beneficial legislation and benign discrimination appear to be troubling 
the Court. Although cases like Bakke are extraordinarily difficult, there is no reason to intro-
duce their conundrums into the issue of which groups should receive heightened judicial 
protection. 
Legislation that should survive heightened scrutiny is of two types: beneficial legislation 
designed to offset disadvantages that result from past discrimination, and legislation based on 
real (rather than stereotypical) differences between groups. The latter is nearly an empty set 
for race, but not for mental retardation and other semi-suspect classes. This fact seems par-
ticularly troubling for Justice Stevens and the Chief Justice. It may not be perfectly clear 
whether such legislation (for example, guardianship for mentally retarded people) is benefi-
cial to the suspect class. Guardianship is beneficial in some cases and disadvantageous in 
others. It is inappropriate to focus on whether retarded people are advantaged by the law in 
question, because the equal protection clause should not be read to insure that all legislation 
will be beneficial. Rather the focus should be on whether the particular legislation is based on 
real differences between groups instead of invidious prejudice. Courts should resist the sug-
gestion that heightened scrutiny be employed only when discriminatory legislation disadvan-
tages the suspect class. Cf Note, The Suspect Context: A New Suspect Classification Doctrine 
for the Mentally Handicapped, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 205 (1984). 
21. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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legislation (e.g., mentally retarded people). For each group, 
lawmakers need more latitude than strict scrutiny affords, but the 
deference inherent in the rational basis test is incompatible with re-
alistic concerns about the likelihood that legislation may be invidi-
ously discriminatory. 
In rejecting intermediate scrutiny, the Cleburne majority ex-
pressed concern that "merely requiring the legislature to justify its 
efforts in these terms may lead it to refrain from acting at all. "22 
Shaping constitutional doctrines to accommodate such political 
consequences is arguably ultra vires23 and certainly seems ill-ad-
vised in this instance. A legislator considering the enactment of 
legislation such as the Education For All Handicapped Children 
Act (Pub. L. No. 94-142) would hardly be deterred by apprehension 
that courts might rule that the legislation was not "closely related 
to an important governmental purpose." 
Presumptive irrelevance has a useful role to play in equal pro-
tection analysis, but it should not be a prerequisite to intermediate 
scrutiny. Rather, the Court should first inquire about the likelihood 
of invidious discrimination through the use of the traditional indicia 
for suspectness. Once the likelihood is found to be substantial, the 
existence of legitimate uses of the classification should be a factor in 
choosing between "middle tier" analysis and strict scrutiny, and 
perhaps in selecting the precise formulation of the intermediate test 
for that particular group. 
This approach would avoid unwarranted intrusions into the 
prerogatives of legislators without ignoring the real possibility of 
discrimination against vulnerable minorities. It would also give 
lower courts more useful guidance than Cleburne's apparent man-
date to use the rational basis test with vaguely sketched variations 
in the degree of skepticism judges are to bring to the issue of legisla-
tive motives. 
Unfortunately, the Cleburne majority left the area of equal pro-
tection in worse disarray than it found it. It should reconsider its 
approach to those classifications that are useful in some situations 
and invidious in others. 
22. 105 S. Ct. at 3257. 
23. For another example of this practice, see Jones v. United States. 463 U.S. 354, 36M 
n.17 (1983). 
